I should perhaps preface these reflections with some evidence as to the experience on which they are based. On a rough calculation, in my fortytwo years of service as a Justice of the Peace, the Benches of which I have been a member (and over which in the past twenty-five years I have generally presided) must have dealt with about 8,000 juveniles, upwards of 7,000 motorists and some 4,000 cases of other offences ranging from street trading to committals on charges of manslaughter. Of the juveniles, only a minority were civil cases relating to non-attendance at school or the need for care, protection or control; most were the subject of criminal charges. All the juveniles and the great majority of the adults have been (subject only to appeal) conclusively dealt with in the courts in which I have officiated, the exception in the case of the adults being committal proceedings concerning cases to be subsequently tried in the higher courts. Out of this whole collection of nearly 20,000 individuals it may entertain you to learn that onea boy of 15 then serving in the merchant navysaid to his probation officer: 'I should like to go back and thank the lady'which he did, very charmingly.
Changes in the Pattern ofCrime During these years there have been many changes in the pattern of offences with which we have to deal. Forty years ago drug charges were unheard of and traffic offences made but a modest contribution to our lists. Today, in London at any rate, scarcely a day passes without one or two charges of possessing dangerous drugs or forging ' Requests for reprints should be sent to: High Barn, Abinger Common, Dorking Meeting Novemnber 301967 Lloyd Roberts Lecture prescriptions in order to obtain them, while motoring offences habitually outnumber all the others put together. Variations in criminal technique are also noticeable from time to time: in my early days violence was generally inflicted by the use of a blunt instrument: today sharp ones seem to be preferred.
Some features of the picture, however, remain remarkably stable. Thus it is always the young male who swells the criminal statistics. For many years now the proportion of 14-year-old boys found guilty of indictable offences has exceeded the figure for any other age. Some people regard this as symptomatic of the moral degeneracy of contemporary youth; but it is equally possible to see in it cheerful evidence that the majority of wayward youngsters grow up into solid and lawabiding citizens. The sex difference, on the other hand, is gradually diminishing, as women make their way in the criminal, as in other, worlds; yet even today for every one female found guilty of an indictable offence 7 males are convicted; so it is still true to say, as I wrote nearly ten years ago, that 'if men behaved like women and boys behaved like girls, the courts would be idle and the prisons empty'.
Since the end of Hitler's war, the jurisdiction of the magistrates' courts has been both widened and narrowed. It has been widened to include the right to deal with cases of breaking and entering (other than those in which a dwelling house is involved) and by the imposition upon us of the exceedingly tedious task of licensing betting shops; it was narrowed in 1964 by the raising of the age of criminal responsibility from 8 to 10, a change which, greatly to my satisfaction, put about 1,300,000 children out of reach of the criminal law. Also, new restrictions will come into force in 1968 upon our power to refuse bail and to impose sentences of imprisonment that are not suspended pending good behaviour.
Something has also been done to ensure that Justices move with the times. We are not quite as amateurishor as elderlyas we were in 1948, when a Royal Commission on Justices of the Peace [1] found that over 25% of those on the active list were over 70 years old, and asked no more of Justices than that they should be 'fairminded, of good character, intelligent and fully capable offollowing the proceedings in court' (my italics). Today no one is appointed to the Bench over the age of 60 and the Lord Chancellor is known to be contemplating legislation to reduce the present compulsory retiring age below 75. Moreover, in contrast with the state of naive and bland ignorance in which I assumed my duties forty-odd years ago, Justices are now required, before taking their seats on the Bench, to undertake a prescribed course of basic training, which includes not only instruction in the law and observation of court procedures, but also visits to penal institutions (though the minimum requirement of two visits is remarkably modest) and discussion of sentencing policy. It is, however, to potentially more fundamental changes, affecting the basic principles of criminal justice, that I wish particularly to direct your attention. Traditionally it is the business of the courts, first, to determine the issue of guilt or innocence and, second, to punish the guilty as they deserve. The strength of this punitive tradition, which I shall suggest is now threatened from more than one quarter, can hardly be overestimated. Indeed I know few lawyers in whose vocabulary the words 'sentence' and 'punishment' are not still virtually interchangeable. Court procedure itself underlines the point, as, for instance, in cases where the accused has the option of trial either by the magistrates or on indictment in a higher court. If he opts for the former, he is told that 'if the magistrates find you guilty and if, after hearing all about you, they think their powers of punishment are not sufficient, you may be sent to Sessions to be sentenced'.
The concepts of guilt and punishment are, in short, inextricably linked and are regarded by long and deep-seated tradition as the keynotes of the whole enterprise. Indeed, traditional legal doctrine (though now breached by large exceptions about which I shall have more to say) holds that, without guilty intention, no conduct can be criminal.
In the discharge of this punitive function, the courts are guided, in the first instance, by the scale of heinousness established by the maximum penalties which Parliament has attached to various offences. Within these maxima (which incidentally are seldom reached) the actual sentence imposed is adjusted, in the light of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, to the court's estimate of the offender's guilt. In this way it is supposed that wickedness earns its due reward and the demands of justice as between one offender and another are said to be satisfied.
The TariffSystem ofSentencing
This, which is generally known as the tariff system of sentencing, is open to the obvious objection that different courts apply different tariffs. Is it not odd that the proportion of men aged 21 and over imprisoned for indictable offences over a period of four years should have been found to vary as between one court and another from 3 % to 55 % [2] ? Again, even if too much weight should not be attached to small numbers, why were nearly 17% of the 3,750 adults convicted in Manchester magistrates' courts in 1966 imprisoned without the option of a fine, when under 10% of the 2,526 convicted in Liverpool were similarly treated [3] ? Why, indeed, does the Liverpool rate run consistently year after year below that of Manchester? And can it be the superior virtue of the Scots which accounts for the fact that the proportion of male prisoners sentenced to three years or more in England and Wales is not far short of four times the corresponding figure North of the Border [4] ?
In the past few years tariff discrepancies as between one court and another have been the subject of much concern both in the magistrates' courts and among the higher judiciary. 'Sentencing exercises' are now frequently organized by the Magistrates' Association and have certainly revealed to those who take part in them remarkable differences in the standards of different Justices. In relation to motoring offences, the Association has attempted to reduce these discrepancies by circulating confidentially to its members a suggested basic tariff, emphasizing, however, that no set of rigid rules can override the need to take account of the particular circumstances of individual cases. It has also recently been announced that the standardization of tariffs is to be encouraged at a more exalted level, by the issue to Justices from the Lord Chancellor's office of periodical statistics relating to average fines imposed for various offences: 'The computer used for this purpose', Lord Gardiner is reported to have said, 'had chewed and digested its diet of criminal statistics with quiet satisfaction for a little more than a year and then burst into enthusiastic activity' [5] . In the higher courts, also, the present Lord Chief Justice has broken new ground by convening 'sentencing conferences' of High Court Judges and Chairmen of Quarter Sessionsfollowing a pattern that is well established on the other side of the Atlantic.
No amount of tidying up, however, can remove the essential subjectivity of any tariff system. For the plain fact is that guilt is not objectively measurable. Bringing divergent tariffs into closer harmony certainly removes chance variations which are liable to create feelings of gross injus-tice; but there is nothing to show whether a more standardized tariff is more accurately adjusted to the measure of an offender's guilt than were any of the divergent extremes which it has ironed out. Obviously, from the point of view of those of us who operate the present system, it has the one great attraction that none of us can ever be proved wrong. Our decisions may be faulted on appeal, but even the ethical superiority of the judgments of the higher court to those of the humbler fry below remains unproven and unprovable. And John Gordon's fulminations in the Sunday press are still no more than his personal opinions. It is this system which itself now seems to be exposed to challenge from more than one quarter. Here I would mention particularly three contemporary trends: first, the changing climate of opinion in an age in which social institutions become increasingly exposed to scientific investigation and at the same time increasingly purposive; second, the devastating influence of psychiatry upon traditional conceptions of guilt; third, the accumulating evidence that in the contemporary world the amount of social damage perpetrated by an offender is less and less consistently related to the wickedness of his intentions.
Effects ofCriminological Research
Significant of the first of these trends is the appearance on the scene of a formidable body of criminological research. Along with scientists in every field, social or physical, criminologists interest themselves in causal relations, notably in the results of the various sentences imposed by the courts. Of 163 criminological research projects in progress, recently listed by the Home Office Research Advisory Committee, a substantial proportion is concerned with the response of convicted offenders to various forms of treatment or with their after-careers. In this way light, it is hoped, may eventually be thrown upon the relative effectiveness of various sentences in reducing recidivism. Admittedly, the yield of established results is as yet small; for such is the complexity of these investigations, and the difficulty both of ensuring that like is compared only with like and of eliminating variations due to differences in personality or environment, that the assessment of the results of any medical treatment in illness must, by comparison, rank almost as child's play. But the significance of these researches lies less in what they have actually achieved than in the implicit presumption that it is the consequences of penal decisions with which we need to be concerned.
I can see trouble coming here for magistrates (and indeed judges also) in more than one form.
Consequences are, potentially at least, demonstrable, and once we are judged by results, we are no longer in the happy position of never being liable to be proved wrong or to be shown up as better or worse than our colleagues on the job. For example: on the assumption that the object of a sentence is to prevent an offender from offending again, it would already be possible to establish (if anyone had the courage to do so) from the comparative frequency of reconvictions in similar cases in different courts that there are degrees of skill in sentencing just as much as in, say, interviewing or personnel selection. Moreover, although the results of follow-up researches are still scanty, they are not negligible. It is already possible by observation of features of an offender's background, history and behaviour to classify both young men in Borstals and older persistent offenders into 'risk classes', the validity of which has been established by subsequent experience. Again, investigations into Scottish experience have demonstrated the generally high reconviction rates that follow short prison sentences, as compared either with fines or with longer terms of imprisonment; while south of the Border it appears, somewhat surprisingly, that thieves respond better to fines while housebreakers, if first offenders, are unusually favourable subjects for probation [6] . Stimulated by these findings one should not, of course, run away with the idea that all thieves ought automatically to be fined and all first-time breakers put on probation, or that all short sentences of imprisonment should be converted into longer terms; but in cases in which the court is hesitating on other grounds between alternative methods of disposal, knowledge of these results may be (and in my case sometimes has been) sufficient to tip the scales.
If, as may reasonably be expected, the fruits of criminological research increase fairly rapidly, the question must soon arise as to how far they can be communicated to, and applied by, an amateur magistracyand indeed a judiciary whose purely legal training is innocent of any contact with either statistics or penology. (Incidentally, it is still possible, though less likely than formerly, for an Assize Judge to be appointed whose previous experience as a barrister has been virtually confined to the civil courts; and Quarter Sessions are often presided over by County Court Judges whose day-to-day work is entirely civil.) Up till now perhaps, neither judge nor magistrate is greatly handicapped in the performance of his duties by failure to digest the still scanty results of criminological research; but, in the long run, money spent on research will be simply wasted unless two vital conditions are fulfilled: the research must produce results that have practical applications and, secondly, those results must be mastered by the judicial authorities who are in a position to apply them. The days of the judge or magistrate who is frightened by the sight of a statistical table areor at least ought to benumbered.
Meanwhile we continue to be gravely handicapped by the virtual impossibility of improving our personal proficiency by critical observation of past performance. Unlike doctors, only rarely are we faced with the results of the treatments which we have prescribed. Although in recent years arrangements have been made to enable judges in the higher courts and, in a limited range of cases, magistrates also to be informed of the subsequent history of persons whom they have sentenced, these are largely ineffective through lack of the long-term systematic recording which they require on the part of those who might use them. The melancholy truth is, therefore, that experience in the courts, although, as elsewhere, apt to command respect, is completely valueless. No one knowsleast of all do I know myselfwhether in my forty odd years I have done more good than harm or more harm than good, nor how my results compare with those of other colleagues of similar experience. It is a sobering thought.
Problems ofSentencing Improved selection and a modicum of training may tide us over for a time yet. But the amateur Justice, who has survived for 600 years, can hardly enjoy a similar expectation of further life. Eventually the task of sentencing must be recognized as a highly expert job requiring specialized trainingby which I emphatically do not mean that the stipendiary magistrates who now function in London and a number of other large cities should everywhere replace the amateur JP; for these professionals (whose number, by the way, is not increasing outside the London area) are themselves trained only in the law, whether as barristers or solicitors. The evolution of sentencing from art into science calls for a far more radical metamorphosis in the qualifications of its practitioners than the mere substitution of lawyer for layman.
Meanwhile, if we are to be judged by results, what, in fact, are the results at which we should aim? The obvious reply is that we should discourage an offender from repeating his offence and other people from imitating him. Yet experience makes it increasingly plain that the hope that, by a single act, respect for the law can always be simultaneously inculcated, both in an offender and in the public at large, is altogether too naYve. Although these twin objectives may often be compatible, this certainly is not always so. To take only one example, our prisons are always well populated with feeble characters who can keep out of trouble only in an exceptionally favourable environment: but the sight of the guilty enjoying not less, but more, eligible conditions than the innocent would hardly be regarded as an encouragement to virtue.
In my experience conflicts between the anticipated effect of a sentence upon an offender and upon his potential imitators can be issues of extreme practical difficulty. Such conflicts cannot be resolved unless and until more is known about the areas in which, and the degree to which, it is fear of the consequences, rather than any other method of social conditioning, which restrains the lawless impulses of the murderer, the thief and the careless driver who lurk in every breast. That the effectiveness of any penalty is closely related to the probability of detection may be taken for granted. No doubt there are, and will be, lessons to be learned here from experience of the breathalyser. The dramatic effect which the new Road Safety Act is said to have had upon drivers' consumption of alcohol is indeed melancholy evidence of the feebleness of any conscientious inhibition against driving 'under the influence'. But what is significant is that the cause of this startling change is not that the penalties for drunk driving have been raised (they have not), but merely that the risk of detection has been increased by the introduction of more sophisticated methods. One may confidently predict that the permanence of would-be drinkers' present abstinence will depend upon how nearly current estimates of the increase of risk prove to be justified.
Equally, I suggest, can we be confident that the internal sanction of social conscience, when operative, is a far more reliable buttress against law-breaking than is the external threat of any likely penalty; but we remain woefully ignorant both as to the limits within which this sanction already operates and, still more, as to the social processes by which its influence might be extended. Admittedly, objective investigation in this field is notoriously difficult; but I would like to recommend for empirical testing the commonsense hypothesis that the generally deterrent effectiveness of penal sanctions tends to be inversely related both to the element of malicious intent in the relevant crime and to the rewards to be reaped from successful criminality. The motorist who is tempted to exceed the speed limit, to park selfishly or even to drive under the influence of drink certainly puts his own interest first; but, unlike the burglar, he does not set out to do, and would probably prefer not to do, any actual damage to another person; nor would it make an enormous difference to him if he drove less fast, parked only where authorized and had a drink or two less. His malicious intent is minimal. All this makes him more, rather than less, sensitive to the penalties which he risks by a breach of the law. If he has already two convictions for speeding within three years, he will be exceptionally careful not to incur the almost certain loss of his licence by acquiring a third. By contrast, to the potential burglar and still more to the professional criminal crime is both an end in itself and a source of immediate and possibly substantial profitwith the result that in his case the risk of penal sanctions is likely to be discounted. For these reasons I doubt if much reliance is to be placed upon the introspections of motorists as a guide to the psychological processes of other criminals. But I would call your attention to the inference that, if these speculations are well founded, it will be in relation to the more serious crimes that the deterrent effect of penal sanctions upon the public at large operates least powerfully or, to put the matter the other way round, I doubt if it is fear of penal consequences which restrains most of us from murder or theft, but I do not dispute that this fear is, in certain circumstances, a powerful inducement to sobriety at the wheel and to moderation of speed.
At this stage I can, therefore, only ask your pity for courts which, in the present state of ignorance on these issues, are expected to kill the criminality of all the birdsthe one inside the court and all the others outsidewith one stone. Imagine, by way of analogy, the plight of a doctor who was required to check the spread of a disease throughout the community by performing radical and, in his opinion, sometimes injurious, surgery upon patients already suffering from it. Imagine that, and you will appreciate the dilmcma in which the courts are all too often trapped.
Psychiatric Influences I turn now to consider the seconc of the three trends which appear to be undermining the traditional preoccupation of the criminal courts with the punishment of guiltnamely the complications introduced into the assessment of guilt by psychiatric considerations. It is perhaps worth reminding ourselves how rapid have been developments in this field: all the significant changes have fallen within the period of my own service as a Justice. Apart from the 'moral imbeciles' specified in the Mental Deficiency Act of 1913 (of whom little was heard in practice) it could be said that half a century ago the courts were only concerned with the mental condition of defendants on criminal charges in cases of unfitness to plead or of insanity within the McNaghten rules; and a defence of insanity, involving indefinite detention in what was then known as a criminal lunatic asylum, was normally only raised in cases of murder. Since then we have had, first, Section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1948 which permits a court to write into a probation order a condition requiring the probationer to undergo mental treatment either in hospital or as outpatient; next the Homicide Act of 1957 which introduced into English law the defence (long-established in Scotland) of diminished responsibility, which, if successful, reduces a charge of murder to a conviction for manslaughter; and, third, the Mental Health Act of 1959 with its comprehensive provisions that an offender who is diagnosed as suffering from certain forms of mental disorder may, provided that the offence of which he is convicted could carry a sentence of imprisonment, be detained under a hospital order instead of being sentenced in the ordinary way.
As a result of these measures, the guilt of a number of offenders is now held to be, in varying degrees, modified by mental disorder; and the traditional practice of assessing guilt is correspondingly complicated. Somewhat surprisingly, it is the earliest of these three Acts which is drawn in the widest terms, inasmuch as it does not strictly require any prior diagnosis of mental disorder. All that is necessary is that the court should be satisfied, on appropriate medical evidence, that mental treatment offers the best chance of reformation; and it is of interest that a requirement of mental treatment as a condition of probation (at least in the early days of its historyrecent information is not available) has been by no means confined to cases, such as sexual offences, which are commonly thought of as involving a 'mental element', but has also been freely used for probationers convicted of such apparently ordinary crimes as thieving.
Under these provisions, however, the offender, though undergoing mental treatment, is not formally transferred from the ranks of the wicked to those of the mentally disordered. The court, one could argue, has been persuaded, not that he is ill, but that mental treatment will have a beneficial effect upon his wickedness. Perhaps it will; but, should this hope be disappointed, or should the probationer fail to submit to the prescribed treatment, he becomes liable to a penal sentence for breach of his probation. In spite of having become a patient, he still retains his potential status as a criminal.
By contrast, the 1957 Homicide Act looks not to treatment, but to the offender's state of mind, as determining the actual crime of which he is convicted: under Section 2 of that Act the difference between murder and manslaughter turns upon proof of impaired responsibility. Accordingly, in homicide cases where this defence is raised, the court is under obligation to draw a definite line between the wicked and the weak-minded and, until the abolition of the death penalty, this was in capital cases a life and death matter. The result, as anyone who has studied the relevant cases must be aware, has been to create a state of hopeless confusion. The question whether a condition of diminished responsibility is compatible with careful planning of a crimeeven the suggestion that a man may be fully responsible when he seizes a stick from the entrance to a house but has become partially irresponsible by the time he is using it to bash an old gentleman in bed upstairsall this may be an occasion for the display of forensic brilliance, but can leave no doubt in minds not hopelessly dazzled by these exhibitions that either wickedness must itself be a form of mental disorder or, if the two are distinguishable in theory, in practice no tenable line can be drawn between them. No doubt the psychiatrists who give evidence on these matters have their own views as to which side of the line between wickedness and mental aberration a particular individual should be classified. But the trouble is that these opinions cannot be subjected to empirical validation. Hence the psychiatrist also (as well as the court, irrespective of whether or not it accepts his guidance) is in the (perhaps to him not unfamiliar) position of not being open to be proved wrong.
Confusion is, moreover, still further confounded by the fact that, even when a verdict of diminished responsibility is returned, the offender is not necessarily thereafter treated as a sick man. In the six years since the relevant provisions of the Mental Health Act came into force, the proportion of diminished responsibility cases made subject to hospital orders has ranged from 42% to 60%, the remainder being, with few exceptions, sentenced to terms of imprisonment. It is indeed always open to the Home Secretary, provided that the prisoner's mental disability can be subsumed under any of the forms of mental disorder recognized by the Mental Health Act, subsequently to transfer him from prison to hospital under Section 72 of that Act; but this is by no means always done. Over the past six years only 12 out of a total of 99 offenders found to be suffering from diminished responsibility and sentenced to imprisonment have been thus transferred to hospital [7] . Altogether, the most that can be said is that the practice of making hospital orders in cases of conviction for manslaughter with diminished responsibility is on the increase; and that at least those who are committed to hospital are genuinely transformed from criminal into patient. Their position, in fact, becomes analogous to that of any other mental patient who is detained under compulsion, subject only to the court's power to impose an order restricting discharge without the consent of the Home Secretary.
Quite apart from homicide cases, which are sentenced only by Assize Judges, the 1959 Mental Health Act also empowers courts of Quarter Sessions and even amateur magistrates, in any case in which a sentence of imprisonment might alternatively have been imposed, to substitute a hospital (or guardianship) order, if the offender has been appropriately diagnosed as suffering from a specified form of mental disorder and the court is satisfied that such an order is the most suitable way of dealing with him; and, in cases of the severer forms of mental disorder, magistrates have also the power (though few of them realize it) to make hospital or guardianship orders without recording a conviction.
The result of these enactments is that at every level the courts now have to worry their heads about questions of mental competence and about the boundary between the penal and the medical sphere such as forty years ago could have been cheerfully ignored. If the lower courts are spared the sophisticated forensic battles provoked by Section 2 of the Homicide Act, they too, in their quieter and more decorous way, are from time to time concerned with not dissimilar issueswith the decision when to invoke medical guidance or to abdicate in favour of medical colleagues. True, the 1,448 hospital and guardianship orders made in 1966 look insignificant beside the total of over 30,000 sentences of imprisonment imposed in that year on persons convicted of indictable offences; but the number of hospital orders has been creeping up over the past five years and at a somewhat faster rate than committals to prison. It is likely too, with the increase in the number of drug addicts appearing before the courts, that the demands of the therapeutic, as against the penal, approach will become increasingly clamorous. The number of probation orders with a condition of mental treatment may be swelled by the inclusion of addicts under obligation to attend one of the proposed treatment centres or, alternatively, if the statutory category of mental illness can be stretched to embrace addiction, the number of hospital orders may be similarly increaseda development which would incidentally have the effect of undermining the voluntary nature of the treatment centres for addicts. And, to complete the picture, the Criminal Justice Act of 1967 with its proposal to transfer alcoholics from prison to what is described as 'suitable accommodation for the care and treatment of persons convicted of being drunk and disorderly' contains at least a hint that addiction to alcohol, no less than to currently more fashionable drugs, may soon be regarded as more of a disease than a crime.
Social Damage due to Carelessness The role of the courts, as instruments for the punishment of wickedness, is thus increasingly complicated, not to say frustrated, both by growing interest in the consequences of penal decisions and by growing uncertainty as to where wickedness merges into weakness of mind. To these disturbing factors must now be added the third member of my potentially revolutionary trio, that is to say, the relative decline in the contribution which deliberate wickedness, as compared with carelessness, negligence or simple lack of consideration, now makes to the total of social damage. For this development we have, of course, to thank the invention of the internal combustion engine even more than the Molochlike qualities of modern industry. Certainly the 1965 aggregate of 205 convictions for murder, manslaughter and infanticide pales beside the figures of 7,952 road deaths and 1,089 fatal accidents in industry. As for the damage to property caused by thefts, breakings and vandalism on the one hand, and by road accidents on the other, reliable estimates are not readily available; but there seems no doubt that it is the latter for which far the larger sums have to be paid out by insurance companies.
In face of this situation the doctrine that guilty intent is an essential element in any crime (and that the prime purpose of the whole criminal process is to locate and punish the guilty in accordance with their deserts) may be said to be fighting a rearguard action. It is in the field of what may be called traditional crime that the hold of this doctrine is at its strongest. The crime of larceny, for example, involves not only the appropriation of someone else's belongings: there must also be proof of intent permanently to deprive the owner of his property; and, what is more, the intent and the deprivation must coincide in time. If you manage to borrow your neighbour's necklace, without her knowledge, meaning to wear it for one party and then slip it back, but afterwards change your mind and decide to keep it, you have not strictly been guilty of theft. Needless to say, to establish these psychological nuances often demands a degree of insight into another's mind that is not given to many of us. I recall, for example, a juvenile court case of some years back in which an office boy was accused of stealing a book describing the history of the well-known publishing house in which he was employed. For the defence it was contended that it was the boy's intention to return the book after reading it and that therefore he could not be found guilty of theft; and this was accepted by starry-eyed magistrates, impressed by the loyalty of the young employee to his firm. Imagine, however, our dismay, on discovering that the next three cases on the list were also charges of stealing from the same publisher, involving books which on the face of them were much more likely to appeal to the average young male.
Again, as evidence of the law's traditional preoccupation with wickedness rather than with social damage, one may contrast the unstinting expenditure of time and money devoted to the apprehension of a single suspected murderer with the absence of any judicial investigation, other than a coroner's inquest, into the great majority of fatal road accidents. The 7,952 road deaths of 1965, for example, were followed by no more than 569 prosecutions (resulting in 436 convictions) for the offence of causing death by dangerous driving. What happened in the other 7,000 odd cases was held to be the private concern of the parties involved and a matter for the civil courts alone.
Nevertheless, even if the sanctity of the principle that it is the guilty intention that makes the crime is still dominant in the sphere of what may be called traditional crimes, this principle now enjoys scant respect in the case of breaches of the mass of statutory regulations by which all our lives are now governed. In the great majority of traffic offences, as well as those relating to such matters as the sale of food and drugs or the conduct of licensed premises, a conviction must be recorded, regardless of whether the offence was in any sense intentional or deliberate, or even knowingly committed. In some cases, as, for example, careless driving, the very nature of the offence virtually precludes implication of deliberate intent: for who is likely to drive carelessly on purpose? But this condition of what the lawyers call 'absolute liability' is by no means confined to offences of this kind. An honest belief that your vehicle was validly insured is, for instance, no defence to a charge of driving without insurance, although it may properly be regarded as justifying a mitigated penalty on the ground that the offence is unlikely to be repeated. Today, therefore, when traffic offences account for more than 65 % of the total of convictions recorded in all courts taken together and, it may be presumed, for an even higher proportion of those dealt with by the magistracy, it is already the exception rather than the rule in the magistrates' courts for a conviction to require proof of guilty intention. Some rather curious anomalies, however, remain. To drive with defective brakes is in all circumstances a criminal offenceeven when the defect is due to a one-in-a-million chance or when the driver is an employee and in any case not responsible for the maintenance of the vehicle. Yet, as already mentioned, the criminal courts take no cognizance of the vast majority of fatal accidents on the road. Thus the man whose brakes endanger life earns a criminal conviction, irrespective of guilty intention or even culpable negligence, but he whose vehicle actually destroys life is liable to conviction only on proof of having driven dangerously. It follows, as an incidental consequence of this paradox (and I have known a case in point) that a driver can be convicted of a traffic offence, such as careless driving or driving without insurance, without the court by which he is sentenced being aware that he has a history of more than one fatal accident. If blameworthiness is the criterion for conviction and it is accepted that the accidents were not his fault, that is fair enough. But how can this be reconciled with recording a conviction against an equally blameless defendant for defective brakes? By what logic can we justify this attempt to have it both ways?
As roads of escape from these anomalies, various proposals have been suggested by those who wish at all costs to preserve the punitive function of the courts. The Law Society, for instance, would make a distinction between what are described as truly criminal acts on the one hand and all offences of 'strict liability' on the other, and would remove the latter from criminal jurisdiction altogetherarguing that the stigma of criminality ought not to be attached to those who intended no wrong. Such a course is, however, open to objection on the ground that, while guilty intention is not a necessary element in a crime of 'strict liability', it is in fact by no means always absent. Thus, to exceed a speed limit is an offence, even if it is the result of a moment of inadvertence; but, in practice, it is, as often as not, a deliberate act. Alternatively, many lawyers hold that the concept of guilty intention should be extended to cover a much wider range of cases of negligence or inadvertenceso that, for example, a conviction for driving without insurance might be recorded only if the accused had omitted to take such steps as he might reasonably have been expected to take in order to ascertain the facts relating to his insurancebut not, as at present, in circumstances in which he could not have known, or was the innocent victim of deception as to, the true position. In my view, however, such proposals, if only on grounds of the litigious accretions already attaching to such words as 'knowingly', 'negligently' or 'inadvertently', deserve no enthusiastic welcome. I myself would argue that society as a whole, and not merely an injured individual, has an interest in the prevention of social damage, whether or not intentionally caused; and that, therefore, it is entirely right and proper that we should all be liable to be called to account for any serious damage that we do, whether by accident, inadvertence or design, since the consequences of an offence bear no necessary relation to the intentions of its perpetrator. I see no logical reason why guilty intention should be written into the definition of every criminal act nor reason to be dismayed by the contemporary proliferation of offences in which this stipulation is omitted. I see this process as not only a necessary, but indeed a welcome adaptation to a world in which the careless and the indifferent do more harm than the wicked.
This development is moreover closely interwoven with the other trends to which I have called your attention. Indeed this lecture might well have carried the subtitle: 'The Decline and Fall of the Concept of Wickedness in British Criminal Procedure'. For not only is wicked intention no longer a necessary ingredient in the definition of every criminal offence: the assessment of culpability has itself, thanks to the influence of psychiatry, become a vastly more complex and uncertain exercise; and in consequence, the tariff system of sentencing, which purports to deal with each according to his deserts, is seen to be less and less compatible with psychological reality. Emphasis, therefore, shifts from the past to the future; and evidence as to an offender's state of mind finds its place, not in the evaluation of his guilt, but as predictive of his probable future behaviour and response to treatment. Prognosis rather than condemnation becomes the password.
I envisage, therefore, a slowvery slowevolution of the criminal courts from the purely punitive institutions of yesterday, blind to their own social consequences, into social agencies, preventive and remedial, rather than retributive in character, concerned with the future rather than the past. That this implies an increasingly close approximation of penal practice to the practice of medicine, in which each is judged by its skill in combating the mischief which is its own peculiar concern, will not, I think, have escaped your notice.
